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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE 
ROLE OF CREDIT IN SMALL FAR!'-1 HOUSEHOLDS 
Calvin J. Miller, Warren F. Lee and Leroy J. Hushak* 
INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural credit is considered an important instrument 
for achieving economic and social integration of small farm house-
holds. Yet, in spite of the large increases in the volume of 
agricultural credit in low-income countries, evidence suggests 
that the present credit systems have not succeeded in providing 
credit assistance to these producers. 
Small farmers tend not to borrow funds. In Bolivia, for 
example, it is reported that only 3.5 percent of the institu-
tional credit goes to small farmers (World Bank). This could 
imply that they are not lacking funds (Schultz) . They may be 
constrained by a lack of profitable investments, especially if 
accessible markets and services are not available. Another ex-
planation is that small farmers are constrained by the costs of 
borrowing. When the costs of obtaining credit are added to 
interest charges, credit use may be unprofitable since these 
costs may represent the major costs of borrowing (Bhatt). Social, 
economic and cultural conditions also affect implicit borrowing 
costs. In addition, small farm households may want funds but are 
*Calvin Miller is a former research associate in the Department of 
Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State Univers-
ity and is currently serving as an agricultural economist with 
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constrained by the risk involved with using credit (Baker, 1973, ~ 
Lipton, Wharton). Thus, an understanding of the affect of each 
of these factors that may impede credit use provides a founda-
tion for improving the research on rural financial market per-
formance. 
This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the role of 
credit in the small farm household and the factors affecting its 
use. The analysis is divided into three sections: (1) the role 
of financial intermediation, (2) the capital resource allocation 
framework of the farm household, and (3) an excess demand for 
funds framework is used to analyze the factors associated with 
credit ~se. Previous empiri~al studies and theories are inte-
grated into the discussions. 
Role of Financial Intermediation 
Fi::1ancial intermediation provides for the transfer of funds 
between households or firms. The existence of financial inter-
mediation provides firms and households with flexibility in 
selecti~g investments and expenditures that best suit their needs. 
This i::1termediation makes it possible for some firms and house-
holds to spend their expected income before they receive it and 
for ot~e~s to earn a return on funds that they want to hold for 
future expenditures. 
~he supply of and demand for funds within a farm household 
are co~..:-:lonly not in equilibrium. Spending needs are not perfectly 
synchrs::1ized with cash flows. In a given time period, some house-
holds ~e~and more funds than they currently have while others have ~ 
an excess supply of funds. Excess supply is defined as that 
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~ amount of funds which are not productively or fully employed by 
the firm or household in such a way as to gain a reasonable rate 
t of return in comparison to the returns which could be gained from 
savings activities through the financial markets, such as bank 
deposits. Thus, households with a funds supply greater than that 
demanded at the market interest rate have an excess supply of 
funds. Stated explicitly, excess supply is: 
where 
0sx is the excess supply of funds, 
QSF is the total funds supply, and 
QDF is the total quantity of funds demanded. 
Excess demand is when the household demand for funds at the market 
~ interest rate is greater than its currently available supply of 
funds fromitsown resources. Excess demand for funds is: 
where 
QDX is the excess demand for funds. 
Without financial intermediation, those households with an excess 
demand for or supply of funds are prevented from producing or 
consuming at their desired level. 
Farm households, and especially those of small farmers, sim-
ultaneously make production and consumption decisions (David and 
Meyer) . The farm firm and farm household are intertwined into one 
unit for decision making. Hence the supply of or demand for funds 
of each household is jointly determined. In this analysis the term 
' 
"farm household" is taken to include all the production and con-
I 
I 
I 
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sumption activities of the farm firm and household, including off-
farm activities. 
The rational economic allocation of resources of any house-
hold occurs when the marginal value product (.MVP) of a resource 
in one use is equal to the MVP of that resource when employed 
in alternative uses. When no financial intermediation exists, 
households having an excess supply of funds receive low marginal 
returns or value from the funds that are not productively employed. 
The opposite holds for those with an excess demand for funds. 
The MVP of funds is high for a household lacking funds in compar-
ison with those households having an excess supply of funds. 
Financial intermediation allows for the systematic transfer 
of funds between those having excess supply and those demanding 
additional funds. In a situation of perfect intermediation, the 
supply and demand are in equilibrium, and economic optimality 
with regard to capital allocation is achieved. However, finan-
cial intermediation is not perfect and recent studies document 
the unsatisfactory performance of rural financial markets in many 
low-income countries (Adams, 1979). Imperfections, legal mech-
anisms and the costs involved with financial intermediation have 
major effects on household participation in financial markets. 
Capital Resource Allocation!/ 
A farm household faces decisions of allocating its resources 
such that it may obtain the maximum utility or benefit possible 
from those resources. Its demand for capital resources or funds 
!/This framework draws from the presentations of Hirschleifer, 
Smith and David. 
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in a given time period is a function of its consumption and 
investment preferences. Given the initial capital endowments, 
a household may prefer to consume or use up all or more of its 
funds at the present time, or it may prefer to invest many of 
those resources for consumption in the future. 
Figure 1 shows the resource allocation possibilities of a 
farm household in a two-time period framework. The horizontal 
axis denotes the present time period and the future time period 
is on the vertical axis. The PP' curve portrays the income 
possibilities curve (IPC). It represents the maximum income 
combinations attainable for a household given its own level of 
capital resources and without financial intermediation. "Without 
financial intermediation" means with no financial market activi-
ties such as borrowing and saving. The household opportunity 
set is thus the area bounded by the curve. Within the opportunity 
set, the household can choose any combination of investment and 
consumption. 
The size of the opportunity set and the shape of the IPC 
curve varies among households. For a richly endowed household 
the opportunity set is large and the IPC is moved outward from 
the origin and encompasses a larger set of feasible income possi-
bilities. The slope of !PC is - (1 + r) where r represents the 
marginal rate of return on investment. The concavity of the 
curve denotes the diminishing marginal rate of return on investment 
by the farm household. At low levels of investment, such as 
investing in seed for future income and consumption, r may be 
~ large, as reflected by the steepness of the curve near the hori-
zontal axis. As investment increases, the marginal returns 
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Figure 1. Utility Maximization with Financial Markets 1 
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c; decrease causing the slope of IPC to diminish. The slope of 
IPC will diminish rapidly at higher investment levels for 
' 
households with limited investment opportunities. Households 
with high marginal investment returns, due for example to 
superior management or improved technologies, would face a steep 
IPC schedule. Hence, for those households each unit of capital 
resources invested in the firm has a comparably large impact on 
future income. 
The rational farm household strives to attain the highest 
level of utility or satisfaction possible given its income possi-
bilities curve or IPC. The actual point of utility maximization 
along the curve is determined by the household's particular 
utility function or indifference curves, which in Figure 1 are 
designated by U.. The shape (slope) of the indifference map for 
1 
present and future consumption stems from factors associated with 
the farm household. These factors include income and asset levels, 
and personal characteristics such as lifestyle, life expectancy, 
foresight and risk aversion. 
With no financial intermediation, the maximum level of utility 
is obtained at point S of Figure 1, which is the point of tangency 
between IPC and u0 , the highest indifference curve that can be 
attained. In Figure 1, os1 is consumed in the first period. The 
quantity s 1P is invested in the first period which provides os 2 
income which may be consumed in the future. Without intermedia-
tion, any increase in consumption in the first period reduces 
consumption in the future. 
With financial intermediation, the farm household may be able 
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to increase its level of utility by borrowing or lending. In 
Figure 1, JJ' represents the optimal market opportunity line 
when the lending and borrowing rates are equal. This line 
represents the price of exchanges between present and future 
consumption in the market. The slope of the line is given by 
-(1 + s} where s represents the rate of interest on borrowing 
and on saving when they are equal to each other. 
Since the rational economic allocation of a resource occurs 
where its marginal value in one use is equal to its marginal 
value in alternative uses, the household will optimally invest 
its capital resources in the firm-household enterprise to the 
point where its marginal value is equal to the market interest 
rate. At point R, the savings and borrowing interest rate, s, 
and the marginal rate of return from investment in the enterprise, 
r, are equal, and thus the economic optimal investment level 
in the enterprise is obtained, given the household's utility 
function. The quantity R1P will be invested in the enterprise. 
To the left of point R along the PP' curve, the marginal return 
from investment, r, is less than s, the return that could be 
gained by investing the funds in the financial market as savings 
deposits. To the right of point R along PP', r is greater than 
s, and therefore the household could benefit by borrowing at rate 
s and would receive a return of r. 
Given an indifference curve schedule of a household as shown 
in Figure 1 and the market interest rate, the household would 
borrow in order to maximize its level of utility. Borrowing allows 
a higher utility function, designated u1 , to be attained. At 
) 
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point T the highest utility level is attained. The household 
will consume OT1 in the first period and OT 2 in the future. The 
optimal level of investment, R1P, in the first period allows for 
the higher consumption level to be achieved. The household will 
borrow R1T1 and will repay R2T2 in the future. 
A household with an initial preference favoring future 
consumption such that it is tangent to the income possibilities 
curve PP' to the left of point R will benefit from participating 
in savings activities through financial intermediation. That 
portion of the curve to the right of point R represents a borrower's 
gain from intermediation. 
Borrowing rates are normally higher than savings rates. 
The marginal cost of borrowing includes not only the cost to the 
saver for the use of his resources, but also the transaction 
costs and the return to the financial intermediaries for their 
services. In Figure 2, the utility function, IPC and market 
savings line are the san~ as in Figure 1. The market line for 
borrowing is KK' with a slope of -(1 + b), where b represents the 
marginal costs (MC) of borrowing and b is greater than s. For 
simplicity in this model, the per unit costs of borrowing are 
depicted as constant. With differential savings and borrowing 
rates, the effective market line becomes J'RSR'K. To the left 
of point R, the market line follows JJ' since that is the market 
line for savings. To the right of R', the effective market line 
is KK', which is the borrowing line. Between points R and R', the 
PP' curve becomes the effective market line since s < r < b and 
~ thus neither lending nor borrowing will occur. 
I2 
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Figure 2. Financial Markets with Differential Borrowing Rates 
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In Figure 2, a household with indifference curve u0 will 
neither borrow nor lend given the effective market line shown. 
A household will only borrow when its initial indifference 
schedule is tangent to the PP' curve at a point below R'. As 
the spread between borrowing and savings rates widens, more 
households are excluded from the benefits of financial markets. 
The shape of the income possibilities curve of each house-
hold is an important factor affecting the point at which one 
would benefit from borrowing. With low investment returns and 
possibilities, r is small (i.e., the IPC is flatter). For a 
given borrowing cost, the IPC would intersect the borrowing line 
closer to the horizontal axis causing fewer households to borrow. 
Households with low investment returns would only borrow when 
they have a relatively high preference for present consumption 
over future consumption of income. 
As shown in Figure 2, a household's use of financial markets 
depends on (1) the investment opportunities it faces, (2) its 
indifference preference for present versus future income, and 
(3) its returns and costs of saving and borrowing. Improved in-
vestment opportunities, a preference to consume more now and lower 
costs of borrowing all contribute toward increasing the utility 
from borrowing. 
Excess Demand for Funds 
An optimizing firm or household operates at a point where 
the marginal costs of a resource are equal to marginal returns. 
Capital resources or money will be demanded until the point where 
the value gained from an additional unit of funds is equal to 
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the costs associated with acquiring those funds. The funds of a ~ 
farm household consist of both its internal equity supply and its 
external, or borrowed funds. The demand for borrowerd funds or 
credit is a residual of the demand for funds minus the supply of 
equity funds available. 
In the framework portraying credit demand as an excess demand 
for funds, the supply of equity funds is treated as a fixed amount 
for each household. However, this framework, shown in Figure 3, 
is valuable in complementing the resource allocation model by 
relaxing the previous constraint of constant marginal costs of 
credit. Many costs and often a major portion of the per unit costs 
of borrowing are not constant for rural households. Moreover, the 
effect of differences of supply of equity funds and marginal value 
product of funds (MVP) schedules on credit demand among households 
may be analyzed with this framework. 
The conditions associated with the excess demand for funds 
framework as shown in Figure 3 are: 
1. Each input is infinitely divisible. 
2. Costs of capital inputs are those costs of 
the inputs which are attributed to the 
given period, in order to overcome the 
lumpiness of many inputs. 
3. The demand for funds is the demand for a 
given time horizon, such as annualized 
demand for funds. 
In figure 3, the amount of credit demanded by a household 
is a function of the marginal value product of funds, the supply 
' 
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of equity funds and the cost of credit. The demand curve is the ~ 
MVP of capital funds schedule. Its shape reflects a diminishing 
marginal utility of funds at a decreasing rate. The S line depicts 
the supply of funds or liquidity from equity or internal sources. 
The MVP of funds curve to the right of the s line represents the 
demand for credit. The costs of credit are shown in Figure 3 
by the average cost {AC) and marginal cost {MC) curves. Because 
of initial transaction costs, the average cost of the first units 
of credit are extremely high. After the initial costs, the MC 
curve follows the {i + MTC + R) curve, where R and MTC begin to 
become significant costs at higher levels for borrowing. The 
fixed initial costs are also reflected by the rapidly decreasing 
AC curve at lower levels of borrowing. The rapidly decreasing 
portion of the AC curve reflects economies of scale in borrowing, ·~ 
since the per unit cost of borrowed funds decreases with quantity 
borrowed. Yet at high levels of borrowing, the cost of obtaining 
credit increases as additional credit becomes harder to obtain. 
A household will not demand credit when the expected average 
costs are greater than the expected average returns. The quantity 
QA represents the borrowing threshold and thus a household will 
never want to borrow a quantity less than Q8QA. When the average 
costs of credit are less than the average returns {i.e., when the 
quantity of credit is greater than Q8QA) , the household will borrow 
Q8QB funds since at point B the marginal costs of obtaining addi-
tional funds {i + MTC + R) are equal to the marginal value product 
of those funds. Hence, the household will demand OQB of funds, of 
which OQ8 will be supplied from its own resources and QSQB will be 
borrowed. 
'-15-
~ The MVP curve, the S line and the cost curves of credit 
• 
are each determined by a set of factors associated with the 
household. The factors affecting each component of the excess 
demand for capital funds framework are discussed individually, 
holding constant other factors, and then joint effects are 
discussed in turn. 
~arginal Value Product for Capital Funds 
The MVP curve for funds of an individual household varies 
with its investment opportunities and capabilities. A house-
hold with many productive investment opportunities would be 
expected to have a large demand for funds, as reflected by a 
high position of the MVP curve relative to the origin, a less 
~ rapidly decreasing MVP curve, or both, resulting in a high demand 
for credit. The level of technology and the managerial capabilities 
of the household are also important factors in determining the 
MVP of funds. Households having superior technology or manage-
ment would be expected to have a higher MVP curve since they 
have higher marginal returns from the use of the funds. However 
a new, more advanced technology does not imply that it is a sup-
erior technology for a given household. The expected marginal 
value of returns to funds are consistent with the contention by 
Schultz that the returns to capital are low on farms which use 
traditional technologies (p. 28). Empirical studies in Brazil 
lead to similar conclusions. Rao concluded that the use of credit 
is very limited in traditional farming and Nehman found that small 
~ farmers got the smallest gain from capital inputs (Rao, p. 148; 
Nehman, p. 111) . 
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The educational level of the household may be a causal 
factor or be correlated with the level of management and the 
technology used. Education is to increase one's awareness and 
understanding and thus should benefit a farmer's management and 
selection of technology. Technical assistance would be expected 
to have a similar effect. A household's language and accessi-
bility to market and information centers may also affect aware-
ness and understanding. 
The productivity level of the household enterprise is a 
crucial factor in determining the MVP of capital and thus the 
use of funds. Higher output levels per unit of input contribute 
toward raising the ~1VP of using capital resources or funds. Cor-
dova found there were not consistently higher output levels among 
small farmer borrowers than non-borrowers in the Philippines (p. 7). 
Tinnermeier and Finn also observed few productivity increases 
with credit use in Peru (p. 34). However, Colyer and Jimenez 
reported increases in productivity levels by those in credit pro-
grams in Columbia (p. 641). David and Meyer suggest that the 
apparent differences in production coefficients may be due to 
omission of other variables. 
The type of enterprise and the market integration are important 
to the value of funds. An enterprise that requires high capital 
inputs has a higher MVP curve for funds than one requiring few 
purchased inputs. Moreover, enterprises with different levels of 
market integration would have different demands for capital funds. 
A high level of market integration and a high demand for purchased 
inputs are expected to be associated, and consequently the use of 
-17-
funds is high. This is exemplified in many studies which show 
operating and investment expenses to be highly associated with 
credit use. Rao found operating expenses to be the most impor-
tant variable in explaining credit use (p. 148). In two other 
Brazilian farm level studies borrowers were found to be assoc-
iated with higher operating and investment expenses per hectare 
and higher farm income and asset levels (Singh, Araujo). This 
would suggest that credit use is positively associated with 
the market integration of the household enterprises. Among low-
income households in Korea, Nyanin found there was a positive 
correlation between credit used, total revenue, debt load at the 
beginning of the year, operating expenses, fertilizer used and 
farm size. Among all households, investment expenses was an 
important variable. However, between borrowers and non-borrowers, 
farm and household incomes, operating expenses and investment ex-
penses were not shown to be different (p. 115). 
The marketing system may be determined in large part by 
the location of the household. As the distance from market 
increases, the marketing costs for both buying inputs and selling 
output increase, causing the marginal return to capital from 
these activities to be less. 
Supply of Equity Funds 
The supply of internal or equity funds from the farm and 
household determines the potential demand for funds from external 
sources. If the amount of funds desired is greater than the 
household has available through its savings and other liquidity 
sources, it will want to borrow. A vertical equity supply line 
-18- 1 
depicting the available internal funds is depicted in Figure 3 
since there is no reason to expect the level of equity funds 
to vary with the rate of return. The equity supply is affected 
by the set of characteristics particular to each household. 
The asset level of the household is the primary factor 
affecting the amount of internal funds supplied. A more richly 
endowed household would be expected to supply more equity funds, 
shifting the S line in Figure 3 to the right. Araujo's study in 
Brazil supported this expectation as he found an inverse rela-
tion between the demand for credit and the volume of internal 
funds (p. 81). Nyanin also found borrowers to have lower asset 
levels and cash at the beginning of the year than non-borrowers 
(p. 114). 
The position of the S line will vary between time periods. ~ 
After a year of drought or bad crops or a year of high expenses 
such as from many purchases or from illness, the amount of funds 
which can be supplied by the household in the next period will be 
less and the S line will be shifted leftward, increasing the 
demand for borrowed funds. A good year would shift the S line to 
the right. In this manner, the supply of equity funds for a 
given period is expected to be inversely related to the net re-
turns from the previous period or periods. 
The age of the farm household affects the position of the 
s line. Older farmers generally have accumulated a larger supply 
of equity funds. Since the excess demand for capital funds is 
the total demand minus that which is supplied by the farm house-
hold, older farmers will tend to have less demand for external 
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funds and hence be less likely to borrow. Singh found that the 
mean age of borrowers was five years younger than that of non-
borrowers (p. 102). 
A World Bank policy paper states that "most farmers borrow 
only when their crop has been poor or if they are faced with 
unusual expenditures ... (p. 27)" The World Bank paper agrees 
with Schultz that in traditional agriculture output of farmers is 
stable or expanding slowly and investment is low. Consequently 
many farmers have accumulated over time the amount of capital 
which is consistent with their technology, the size of their 
holdings and the number of their workers (Schultz, p. 24). 
Cost of Credit 
The third major component of the excess demand for funds 
framework is its cost. Quantity demanded for capital funds is 
expected to be inversely related to the cost, as confirmed in a 
study by Araujo (p. 81). The cost of credit is a function of 
interest costs, transaction costs and the costs associated with 
risk. This cost schedule defines the credit supply for each 
household. 
Interest costs are relatively constant marginal credit costs. 
The interest rate for a farm household is constant until high 
levels of borrowing by a household are reached. At high levels 
of borrowing, relative to the asset and income levels of the 
household, the interest rate rises as more costly sources of 
credit are used. Interest rates are affected by the state of the 
economy, governmental policies and regulations, and by the pol-
icies and availability of funds of the lender. They generally 
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vary inversely with the money supply of the country and the 
lenders' supply of funds, and directly with the inflation rate. 
Policies which regulate the maximum interest rates which may be 
charged by the lender cause the quantity demanded of borrowed 
funds to be high while similar regulations on deposits may 
lower the lender's supply of loanable funds. Real interest costs 
when discounted for inflation may be negative as is often the 
case in many low-income countries (Adams, 1978). 
Transaction costs depend on the ease of borrowing. Trans-
action costs include the paperwork involved in obtaining a loan, 
time involved, associated legal costs, loan fees, travel expenses 
and the psychological cost to the borrower resulting, for example, 
from not understanding loan procedures. In contrast to interest 
costs, transaction costs are largely a fixed cost of borrowing. 
The fixed initial transaction costs are those which must be 
incurred regardless of loan size. Loan transaction costs typ-
ically make up a very large part of borrowing costs for small and 
medium-sized borrowers. Hence the loan transaction costs may be 
an important factor discouraging small and new borrowers from 
using credit from formal sources (Adams, 1978, Bhatt). 
The decision by a farm household of whether to borrow from 
formal of informal sources may hinge upon the quantity of credit 
demanded and the differences in the interest rates and the trans-
action costs between the two sources. Borrowing from informal 
sources may be easier and lower transactions costs are incurred 
than with formal credit, due to less paperwork, less time and 
lower transportation costs. For example, borrowing from a neighbor 
' 
-21-
may result in very low costs in obtaining a loan. However, the 
interest or payments in kind charged by informal lenders may be 
larger. Nehman found in Brazil that informal loans carried 
nominal interest rates of 29 to 40 percent while formal loan 
rates were 7 to 13 percent. A compensating balance was that 
formal loan applicants required an average of 3.0 visits to the 
lender for a loan as opposed to 1.1 visits for informal loans. 
In addition the formal applicants were required to pay appraisal 
and registration fees. The non-interest costs raised the cost 
for small formal loans close to the informal loan charges. 
Consequently, Nehman found that the majority of small loans were 
from informal sources while most large loans were from formal 
sources. Also, the smaller farmers were the holders of the 
~ smaller loans. Nyanin found that small farmers in Korea use 
proportionately less credit than larger farmers, and smaller 
farmers also use proportionately more informal credit (p. 113). 
These studies support the argument by Bhatt that the transaction 
costs of obtaining credit are important and inhibit small farmers' 
participation in applying for formal credit. He argues that high 
transaction costs keep the formal lending institutions from 
competing effectively with the money lenders in rural areas. 
In Figure 3, the effect of initial transaction costs on 
average borrowing costs are shown by the position of the AC 
curve above the interest rate line. An increase in initial 
transaction costs is reflected as an upward shift of the AC curve, 
causing QSQA to be larger. One factor in determining the posi-
~ tion of the AC curve is the distance of the household from the 
lender. It affects the potential borrower's time and travel 
costs. This cost is expected to be minimal for informal loans. 
A previous good borrowing record also affects the AC curve by 
lowering the initial transaction costs. 
The level of education and the ability of the credit 
seeker to understand the language spoken in the business centers 
are other important factors concerning transaction costs for 
formal credit. A higher level of education and a better under-
standing of the business language would move the AC curve down-
ward. Less time and effort presumably is required to communicate 
with the lenders and to understand the paperwork. Education 
and language affect the "psychological costs" of borrowing as 
well. Higher educational levels and better ability to communi-
• 
cate with the lenders are expected to reduce the fear of ignor- ~ 
ance and inferiority. In conjunction with education is the 
literacy of the household, which can have a crucial effect on 
borrowing costs. Illiteracy can immensely raise the mental costs 
along with raising the time and paperwork costs. 
The attitudes and values of the farm household similarly 
determine the psychological costs of borrowing. These attri-
butes, which are not readily measured, may be associated with the 
cultural, ethnic and religious background, the education, the 
location and the lifestyle of the household and their trust and 
understanding of the lender. Gillette and Uphoff found attitudes 
and values, in addition to risk, to be leading factors in-deter-
mining participation in credit programs. This includes attitudes 
and values relating to work and production as well as to credit 
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and lending institutions. 
The stated use of credit can be another factor affecting 
the transaction and interest costs. A borrower may find it 
easy to obtain credit for fertilizer or cattle but hard to 
finance a bicycle or consumption needs. In order to lower 
borrowing costs for consumption and other purposes not pre-
f erred by lenders, a borrower may in some situations state one 
reason for borrowing and use the credit for another purpose. 
He may also allocate the capital resources such that he uses 
his own funds for purposes not preferred by lenders and borrows 
for those which lenders prefer. Von Pischke and Adams therefore 
suggest that due to such fungibility, agricultural credit should 
be viewed as additional liquidity rather than as a farm input. 
Loan security is important to lenders. Asset and income 
levels are commonly used to secure loans. Assets are used as 
collateral, and incomes as a measure of cash flow and repayment 
capacity. When the credit supply of the lender is limited, the 
lender may use loan security as a means of rationing credit. 
Households that are able to provide high loan security are given 
priority for credit. The higher his security for a given house-
hold, generally the easier it is to borrow. For other house-
holds with less such loan security, credit is not as readily 
attainable, causing the cost of obtaining credit to be high. 
Hence, the farm household with few assets and a low income may 
face such high transaction costs associated with borrowed capital 
that the use of credit is not feasible. 
Credit may also be apportioned on a friendship or a political 
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basis. In addition to loan security and repayment ability, such 
favoritism can be important in the apportionment of credit. 
Ladman and Tinnermeier show in Bolivia that credit is indeed 
subject to much political manipulation. 
Risk is a major factor in determining the cost of credit 
because leverage increases the variance of net returns. The 
farm household will borrow up to the point where marginal costs 
of funds are equal to marginal returns. These costs include 
the implicit cost of risk, in addition to the interest and 
transaction costs. The cost of risk of using borrowed funds is 
expected to increase at an increasing rate as the financial 
leverage increases. While the household's particular aversion 
to risk is very important in determining the cost it assigns to 
risk, the measure of the household's willingness and ability to 
bear risk is primarily a function of its wealth both on and off-
farm. In a credit-risk study by Schluter in India, farm size 
and non-farm income and assets were used to measure farmer's 
risk-bearing ability. 
According to Baker, as one borrows he uses up credit reserves 
for future borrowing, which represents a cost to the borrower 
from loss of liquidity (Baker, 1968, p. 507). Each household 
has a limited amount of funds that it can reasonably expect to 
be attainable, which may be called its borrowing capacity. For 
a given household and borrowing capacity, the cost of using up 
one's credit reserves is a function of the risk associated with 
the loss of those reserves. 
As borrowing increases to higher levels toward one's 
borrowing limit, the cost of risk (R) becomes more important 
' 
' 
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as a factor in increasing the cost of credit, as shown in Figure 
3. For example, a household will not use up all its credit 
reserves to the point where it could not obtain financing for 
other investment opportunities, for machinery repairs or for 
medical assistance, if desired or needed. For a given level of 
reserve, the cost of R depends on the riskiness of the enterprise 
and the household aversion to risk. In riskier enterprises where 
the possibilities of loss are greater, a high cost is expected 
to be associated with the loss of credit reserves. A household 
that is very risk averse will attach a large cost to the loss of 
reserves. 
Each component of the model is a function of a set of 
household characteristics or factors. The demand for funds is 
a function of the factors which determine the MVP of funds 
schedule for each particular household. The demand for credit 
is the excess demand for funds. It is that portion of the MVP 
of funds schedule that cannot be supplied by the internal or 
equity sources. The supply of credit is the cost schedule of 
borrowed funds. It is a function of the interest costs, transac-
tion costs and the costs associated with risk. The quantity of 
credit demanded by a farm household is thus determined by the 
interaction of its excess demand for funds and its credit supply 
schedule. 
Interactions of the Model 
A household with little or no education may have low re-
turns to the use of funds and high transaction costs of borrowing, 
such that the costs of credit outweigh the benefits. In Figure 3, 
this situation is shown by a cost curve above the MVP of credit 
curve. Low returns would cause the MVP curve to be low and 
rapidly decreasing, and the high transaction costs of the poorly 
educated would push the cost curves far above the interest cost 
level. If the household did not speak the language used in 
financial centers, the transaction costs are even greater. 
A far~ household with few assets and a high demand for 
funds may also not borrow due to facing high transaction costs 
because of low equity. It would cause QSQA to be large. The 
low equity may also increase the cost of risk for the household. 
This may be the case of a beginning farmer who cannot meet the 
collateral requirements a lender may request. Conversely, a 
household with many assets and a high capital demand may borrow 
a large amount of funds. The interest cost rather than the trans- ~ 
action costs would be the major cost for these households. The 
beginning farmer with few assets may, however, be a friend of a 
lender and thus be able to obtain funds at a low cost. 
A farm household located far from financial and market 
centers would also be depicted by a large QSQA due to high trans-
action costs. Not only would the household's time and transport-
ation costs be high, but also the understanding of the formal 
credit system may be less. In addition, the location may cause 
the value of production to be heavily discounted for transportation 
costs and the costs of inputs to be higher. This in turn would 
lower the MVP curve. With high transaction costs and a low MVP 
curve the household would not be likely to borrow. Yet, if the 
household has superior management and technology, it may have a ~ 
t 
• 
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strong desire to obtain funds for a profitable investment oppor-
tunity. The high MVP for funds curve could more than off-set 
the large transaction costs and the household would borrow. 
An alternative would be for the farm household to borrow the 
funds from informal credit sources, which would have lower trans-
action costs but presumably higher interest charges. This situa-
tion is reflected in Figure 3 by higher interest costs, but 
smaller QSQA initial transaction costs. 
Summary and Implications 
The conceptual framework provides the structure for anal-
yzing the role of financial markets on small farm households. 
Some households will neither borrow nor save. The number of 
these households is directly related to the cost of financial 
intermediation. This cost varies among households depending 
on the factors and conditions associated with each household. 
It is recognized that the interest charges are only one component 
of the intermediation costs, and hence credit policy must also 
focus on the non-interest costs of financial intermediation. 
The important factors affecting households' borrowing be-
havior, and their implications are identified from the conceptual 
framework. Based upon this structure, the major factors expected 
to affect the farm household's demand for credit are the asset 
level, internal funds supply, location, education, age, enterprise, 
technology level, market integration, and production aspirations. 
On the supply side, education, language, location, previous borrow-
ing experience, interest and other loan charges, psychological cred-
it costs, loan size, collateral, and farmer's attitudes toward risk 
are expected to be important. 
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